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ARTICLE 
 
State Racism and the Paradox of Biopower 
Elisa Fiaccadori, Independent Researcher 
 
ABSTRACT: As it has often been emphasised, through the concept of biopower, Foucault at-
tempts to move away from the problem of sovereign power. Yet, after exposing Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of biopower, in this article I argue that he cannot simply leave this problem 
behind. In particular, reflections on Nazism and how the Nazi state uses racism to sustain it-
self force him to return to the problem of sovereign power to explain how state killing contin-
ues to be possible, and actually takes on new and extreme forms, in modern times. These same 
considerations further complicate the theoretical distinction between biopower and sovereign 
power put forward, albeit not without hesitations, by Foucault but contested by other authors 
such as Agamben, while offering an interesting standpoint from which to reconsider the ques-
tion of sovereignty and its interrelationship to biopower. 
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The term “biopower” was first used by Foucault in the last of his College de France lectures of 
1975-6, Society Must Be Defended.1 With this term, Foucault means governments’ ability to 
regulate and control subjects – or to be more precise “populations” – by optimising the 
productivity of their lives in terms of improving their health, welfare and labour productivity 
through a number of technologies or mechanisms of power. Contrary to sovereign power, 
which is based on the sovereign’s ability to kill, biopower is defined by Foucault as “the right 
to ‘make’ live and to ‘let’ die.”2 
                                                          
 I thank Dr. Alberto Toscano, Prof. Didier Bigo and Prof. Kate Nash for constructive comments on early ver-
sions of aspects of this paper and for their encouragement. I am also indebted to the two anonymous review-
ers for their very helpful feedback to this article. Their generous comments and subtle criticisms have been 
invaluable to helping me fully drawn out the stakes of my paper and shaping its final version. I further 
thank Brandy Jesen for proofreading an early version of this paper. 
1 In Britain, the major source for Foucault’s notion of biopower before the publication of Society Must Be 
Defended, Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, edited by Mauro Bertani and Alessandro Fontana and 
translated by David Macey (London: Penguin Books, 2003) and, more recently, Security, Territory, Population. 
Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008) and The Birth of Biopolitics, Lectures at 
the Collège de France, 1978-1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), both edited by Michel Senellart and translated 
by Graham Burchell, had been The Will To Knowledge (1978) [1976], originally published as Michel Foucault, 
The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, An Introduction (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1981). 
2 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 241. 
Fiaccadori: The Paradox of Biopower 
152 
 
Through a dissection of Foucault’s understanding of biopower in this article I will 
bring into focus some of Foucault’s own, as well as my own, perplexities in relation to his no-
tion of biopower as substituting versus complementing sovereign power. More specifically, 
after dissecting Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, I will focus on Foucault's latter work, Society 
Must Be Defended, which, I, in line with Montag, believe that as “a work in transition” allows a 
better understanding of the opposing interpretations of Foucault’s notion of biopolitics.3 My 
aim here, however, is not to simply map out internal inconsistencies or what I prefer to define 
as moments of hesitation, in Foucault’s work. Instead, the central goal of the article is to criti-
cally and productively engage Foucault's thinking on biopolitics and sovereign power, also 
drawing on other authors’ insights, to help to clarify what is at stake in these debates: the 
place of sovereignty in the contemporary biopolitical context. The article consists of three main 
sections. 
The first section will be mainly expository and will be dedicated to analysing Fou-
cault’s notion of biopower closely, explaining what Foucault means by the term and on what 
basis he differentiates it from sovereign power. In this section I will also go through the dis-
tinction that Foucault makes between biopower and biopolitics, also briefly focusing on how 
other theorists, in particular Hardt and Negri, have made this distinction central to their own 
work. This will make evident some of the different uses of the terms biopower and biopolitics, 
as well as highlight certain limitations related to a too broad use in the awareness, however, 
that broader questions cannot be completely evaded. 
My own penchant for a use of biopolitics that, while being attentive to mechanisms of 
sub-power, also takes into account broader questions about how biopolitics and sovereign 
power are interrelated and draw on each other to sustain themselves will become evident in 
the third and final section. The state as understood in terms of ensemble of relations but also 
as driven by a decisionist logic remains central to my understanding.4 My argument is that, 
although Foucault is correct to suggest that power is not reducible to an idea of it as top-down 
domination, disciplinary apparatuses and biopolitical mechanisms do not “replace” sover-
eignist forms of power which, as Foucault himself notices, in actual fact continue and take on 
new forms in the contemporary context. 
Faced with Nazism, Foucault is forced to return to the question of sovereignty and to 
recognise that far from being undoable; “the play between the sovereign right to kill and 
biopower” persists in contemporary societies and is in reality part of “the workings of all 
States.”5 State racism is that which helps him to address the unresolved question of its 
persistence in societies dominated by biopolitical technologies. All of this will be discussed in 
section 2. In this section, Foucault’s take on state racism will also be compared to Agamben’s 
brief discussion of the same to highlight the originality and usefulness of Foucault’s approach 
to an appraisal of contemporary forms of racism.   
As previously mentioned, however, it is in the third and final section that my own 
interpretation of the relationship between biopower and sovereign power, which finds its 
                                                          
3 S. Montag, “Towards a Conception of Racism without Race: Foucault and Contemporary Bio-politics”, Pli: 
The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, vol. 13 (2002).  
4 Foucault’s idea of the state as ensemble of relations is developed further by, for instance, Bob Jessop and 
Thomas Lemke.  
5 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 261. 
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basis but is more complicated in Foucault’s thinking than some readings allow, will be fully 
expanded. In this section, I will, further question whether Foucault provides a fully 
satisfactory answer to the problem of sovereign power by returning to certain Agambenian 
intuitions. These insights, although also not entirely satisfying, help to bridge the gap between 
an understanding of (bio)power as simply reducible to sovereign power and one which 
dismisses the question of (state) sovereignty altogether. Agamben is chosen as the author who 
has not only made biopolitics a central theme of his own work but, as we shall see, has done so 
in a way that challenges, while not necessarily contradicting, Foucault’s formulation.6 
The article will conclude by arguing about the necessity and importance of continuing 
to pose the question of the relation between biopower and sovereign power at any given time, 
including and especially, in the contemporary context. 
  
Biopower 
Foucault’s genealogical critique does not attempt to deny the importance of sovereignty as “a 
problem.” However, instead of treating the problem of sovereignty as “the central problem of 
right in Western societies,” through his concepts of “disciplinary power” first and “biopower” 
later, Foucault attempts to move away from classical interpretations of power as top-down 
domination. According to Foucault, both “disciplinary power” and “biopower” are different 
types of power that cannot be explained in terms of sovereignty. The theory of sovereignty, he 
argues, dates back to the Middle Ages – from the reactivation of Roman law. However, 
whatever the reasons for utilising this theory in the past, in modern times, sovereignty, as a 
general category of the nation or of the people, is not sufficient to explain how technologies of 
power, which are no longer presented exclusively in terms of legality and sovereignty, 
function in modern societies.7 This is because, on the one hand, power works in different ways 
than it did before. For Foucault, biopower works by regulating and controlling populations 
that “may or may not be territorialised upon the nation, society or pre-given communities.”8 
On the other hand, Foucault suggests that the theory of sovereignty neglects to address how 
power is embodied in a number of “local, regional, and material institutions” rather than in a 
central figure such as the state. Specifically, Foucault argues that it fails to account for how 
modern mechanisms of power associated with systems of governance work at the local, micro 
and lowest level “to exclude the mad,” “control infantile sexuality” and “control, punish and 
reform the delinquent,” among other groups of people.9 He says,  
 
[I]t is as though power, which used to have sovereignty as its modality or organising 
schema, found itself unable to govern the economic and political body of society that was 
                                                          
6 As Anke Snoek says “Agamben’s contribution is not meant as criticism, although it sometimes radically 
changes Foucault’s concepts” (Anke Snoek, “Agamben’s Foucault: An overview”, Foucault Studies, no.10 
(2010), 44-67). Agamben himself talks about a line of thinking that “seems to be logically implicit in 
Foucault’s work” (Giorgio Agamben, Home Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare life, edited and translated by 
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988)). 
7 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 34, 26, 27. 
8 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Biopower Today”, BioSocieties, vol. 1 (2006), 197. 
9 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 27, and 33. 
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undergoing both a demographic explosion and industrialisation. So much so that far too 
many things were escaping the old mechanism of the power of sovereignty.10 
 
Foucault’s questioning of sovereign power is both historical (based on the problematisation of 
its past uses) and methodological (based on a choice of how to investigate it) and based on his 
hostility toward state-centred analyses or fixations on the state as site of oppression and/or 
struggle and liberation. He argues that power is never simply a matter of intentions or 
decisions or “a phenomenon of mass and homogeneous domination,” but it circulates in 
networks and individuals “are in a position to both submit and exercise this power.”11 As the 
editors of Society Must Be Defended say, it is difficult to know which works exactly Foucault is 
referring to here because no references are given in the book. However, given that Foucault 
criticises these elsewhere, I infer that Foucault’s reference and opposition is probably some 
tenets of Marxism, especially Marxist-Leninist theories of the state as instrument of class 
domination.12 
In The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, Foucault further offers a bipolar diagram of power 
whereby “biopolitics”13 comes to be conceived as one of the poles of “biopower,” the other 
being “discipline.”14 More specifically, he distinguishes between two mechanisms of power. 
On the one hand, there is “disciplinary power” (“an anatomo-politics of the human body”), whose 
emergence he traces back to the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth, and 
whose primary application concerns the individual human body. On the other, there is 
“biopower” (“a biopolitics of the population”), which, in his words, “is not applied to man-as-
body but to the living being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species.”15 Biopower emerged 
during the second half of the eighteenth century in Europe at the same time as biology 
emerged as a discipline, which redefines the human in biological terms.16 It is at that time that 
biopower started to “dovetail into, integrate, modify to some extent, and above all, use by sort 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 249. 
11 Ibid., 28, and 29. 
12 For an understanding of the complicated relation of Foucault to Marxism, see, for example, Warren 
Montag, “The Soul is the Prison of the Body: Althusser and Foucault 1970-1975”, Yale French Studies, (Fall, 
1995); and Montag “Towards a Conception of Racism without Race”; Olssen, “Foucault and Marxism: 
Rewriting the theory of historical materialism”, Policy Futures in Education, vol. 2 (2004), 454-482; Étienne 
Balibar, “Foucault and Marx: The question of nominalism”, in Armstrong, Timothy J. (ed.), Michel Foucault 
philosopher (New York: Routledge, 1992), 38-56. 
13 Foucault did not coin the term “biopolitics”. As Esposito points out, the Swiss political scientist Rudolph 
Kjellen first introduced it in 1911. Roberto Esposito, BIOS, Biopolitica e Filosofia (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), 3-16. 
14 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. See also Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Thoughts on the 
Concept of Bipower Today”, Conference paper, Vital Politics, London 2 (5–7 September, 2003). 
15 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 42. 
16 The centrality of Europe to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics is evident. However, some authors have 
criticised this centrality, as well as pointing out that colonial power tends to rely on its own forms of 
oppression and reproduction. See, for example, Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s 
History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995); John Solomon, 
“Saving ‘Population’ From Governmentality” in Allain Brossat, et.al. (eds), Biopolitcs, Ethics and Subjectivation 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2011), 198. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial 
Histories (Princeton University Press, 1993). David Scott, “Colonial Governamentality”, Social Text, vol. 43 
(1995), 191-220. 
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of infiltrating, embedding itself in existing disciplinary techniques.”17 Put differently, 
according to Foucault, this new technology of power, centred on regulatory control, is 
superimposed onto disciplinary mechanisms to deal with populations as such and not just 
with individual bodies. It is interesting to note that at this point Foucault also appears to 
distinguish between “biopower” and “biopolitics,” wherein the former is a broader term that 
encompasses both biopolitics and discipline, whilst the latter term refers to “the constitution 
and incorporation of the population as a new subject of governance.”18 Some theorists, 
however, have suggested that this distinction is not of paramount importance for Foucault on 
the basis that at other times he uses the terms interchangeably.19 Others instead insist that this 
distinction is fundamental to understand the workings of power for Foucault.20 While others 
still have taken it up and developed it in original, but not always faithful, ways.21  
Hardt and Negri, for example, give biopower a negative connotation, whilst they 
employ the concept of biopolitics to demarcate a more generalised idea about contemporary 
capitalist societies today. Specifically, for them biopolitics delineates a new era of capitalist 
production, namely the era of Empire or of real subsumption, and assumes a more positive 
valance if considered in relation to the possibilities of resistance brought about by the 
interplay between biopower and capitalism. For Hardt and Negri, in fact, the relation between 
biopower and capitalism is paramount and one which, they argue, Foucault explicitly links “in 
several works,” but fails to develop systematically.22 The reasons why Foucault does not are in 
reality multiple and quite complex. In my opinion, one is surely linked to his belief that, 
although biopower is concerned with raising productivity, thus, “an indispensable element in 
the development of capitalism,” it is not reducible to it.23 Furthermore, as Jessop notes, 
Foucault is fully aware that “capitalism has penetrated deeply into our existence”24 but when 
he “introduces the logic of capitalism, he does not ground it in a detailed account of the social 
relations of production” because he is interested in exposing transferable techniques and/or 
technologies for the conduct of conduct.25 His main focus is on governmentality, the history of 
                                                          
17 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 242. 
18 Catherine Mills, “Biopolitics, Eugenics, and Nihilism”, in Matthew Calarco and Steven DeCaroli (eds. and 
trans.), Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty & Life (Stanford University Press: California, 2007), 273n4. 
19 Although this might seem as a simplistic reading, it is not uncommon. See, for instance, Clare O’Farell, 
Michael Foucault (London: Sage, 2005), 105; Kevin Stenson, “Surveillance and Sovereignty” in Mathieu 
Deflem (ed), Surveillance and Governance (UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2008), 289 among others. 
Mills herself maintains that even though Foucault makes this distinction, “he does not rigorously maintain 
it” 
(Mills, Biopolitics, Eugenics, and Nihilism). 
20 Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose, “Thoughts on the concept of biopower today”; Timothy C. Campbell, 
Improper Life: Technology and Biopolitics from Heidegger to Agamben (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2011). 
21 See, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 2000); Maurizio 
Lazzarato, “From Biopower to Biopolitics”, Pli: The Warwick Journal of Philosophy, vol. 13 (2002), 100–112. 
22 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 27.  
23 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 141. 
24 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 32. Also quoted in Bob Jessop, State Power (Cambridge: Polity Press). 
25 Bob Jessop, “Constituting Another Foucault Effect. Foucault on States and Statecraft”, in Ulrich Bröckling, 
Susanne Krasmann & Thomas Lemke (eds.), Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 70n6. 
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liberalism and neoliberalism. On the other hand, in a more Marxist vein, albeit one that 
attempts to go beyond classical Marxist theories of imperialism,26 as well as Marxist emphasis 
on labour as a “form-giving activity,”27 Hardt and Negri are very much concerned with 
capitalism and “the informational mode of production,” as they call it. They are concerned 
with the logic of capitalism as a globalising system of rule whose (bio)power extends to all of 
those who work under it. 
In brief, they assert that the centre of production and privileged location for the 
extraction of surplus value is no longer the factory but society as a whole. 28 This has produced 
a situation of real (as opposed to formal) subsumption (or total domination of capital), which 
in turn, however, also means that life is not only the object of capitalist biopower but “comes 
to constitute the terrain where counter-powers and forms of resistance are formed and 
moulded.”29 No longer based (solely) on traditional forms of struggle, namely working class 
struggle – for them it seems that these forms of struggle have become somewhat redundant – 
we have the emergence of new forms of resistance based on the power of what they call “the 
multitude.”30 By multitude, they mean, in a very inclusive way, all of those who by working 
under the rule of capital have the potential of refusing its rules and resisting its domination.31 
According to Hardt and Negri, “life” or “creativity” in the form of living labour is captured 
“in the mesh of capitalism valorisation,” becoming the object of expropriation and domination. 
But it is also that which can free itself or resist this mode of capture because it is irreducible to 
the control that tries to subdue32 and create the condition for a more positive outlook of 
biopolitics.33 It is because of their trust in the autonomous, creative power of the multitude that 
Hardt and Negri are able to offer a periodisation which seeks to account for what the authors 
consider “a qualitative break with Marx’s time and ours,” while retaining some of the insights 
                                                          
26 The literature on imperialism is unsurprisingly enormous. For a critical survey of Marxist theories of 
“imperialism”, see Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, A Critical Survey (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001).   
27 This is Sean Sayer's term. See Sean Sayer, “The Concept of Labor: Marx and His Critics”, Science & Society, 
vol. 71, no. 4 (2007), 431–454. 
28 In particular, see Negri’s notion of the “diffuse factory” or the “factory without walls” (Antonio Negri, The 
Politics of Subversion: A Manifest for the Twenty First Century (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997), 204). And here 
we understand exactly why for Negri (and Hardt) Foucault’s biopower becomes important. It brings 
attention to “life” as the new, privileged object of expropriation and exploitation (although how “new” this 
really is, is open to questions).  
29 Thomas Lemke, “Biopolitics and beyond. On the reception of a vital Foucauldian notion”,Biopolitca.cl 
(2011), 4. Online Article. Available at: http://www.biopolitica.cl/docs/Biopolitics_and_beyond.pdf 
30 The Spinozian concept of the multitude has been amply commented upon and criticised from many per-
spectives. For critical, more orthodox Marxist takes on this issue see, for example, Alex Callinicos, The Re-
sources of Critique (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), 145-146; the essays by Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, Ellen 
Meiksins Wood, and again Callinicos, in Gopal Balakrishnan and Stanley Aronowitz (eds) Debating Empire, 
(UK: Verso, 2003). See also Mike Davis, Planet of Slums (London: Verso, 2006) for a salutary reminder of the 
concrete difficulties facing the urban poor in their great diversity settings. 
31 Hardt and Negri, Empire, 129. 
32 Antonio Negri, “On Rem Koolhaas”, Radical Philosophy 154, and 49. 
33 Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2004), 106. 
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provided by Foucault through his concept of biopower. In their account, biopolitical 
production or resistance precedes the (bio)power of capital to dominate and subjugate life. 
However, how congruent their conceptualizations and specific periodisation are with 
that of Foucault (or incidentally with Marx) is, as some have indicated, an open question and 
one that ultimately exceeds the scope of this paper.34 Suffice to say here that: 1) in Foucault’s 
work there is no clear sense of biopower and biopolitics assuming a positive valence; even as 
we accept that for Foucault power is “positive” in the sense of productive. 2) For Foucault 
“[w]here there is power there is resistance,”35 but whether this means that resistance precedes 
power as Hardt and Negri affirm is not so clear-cut,36 and 3) the way Hardt and Negri use the 
term biopolitics is very broad and, as Toscano says, because of its all-encompassing 
dimension, Hardt and Negri’s biopolitics risks ignoring the capillary and subjectifying 
mechanisms of biopolitical “sub-power.”37 
For Foucault, biopower takes as its object “the entire domain of human life.”38 But it 
works in a capillary, preventive fashion, dealing with a multiplicity of aleatory and often 
unpredictable phenomena. Among these Foucault mentions: all phenomena related to “birth-
control,” “problems of morbidity,” not so much epidemics but “endemics” or illnesses that are 
routinely prevalent in a particular population, “public hygiene,” ”problems of reproduction,” 
the problems of “old age,” ”accidents” and “the effects of the environment.”39 Biopower is 
thus not just about disciplining individuals through regulative mechanisms as in disciplinary 
power. It is not only about turning men into subjects of labour – an idea which as Jason Read 
notes, Foucault sometimes develops as a critique and at other times attributes to Marx.40 It is 
about using “overall [security] mechanisms and acting in such a way as to achieve an overall 
equilibrium or regularity.”41 Biopower works at the level of generality (or at the level of 
populations) with the aim of identifying abnormalities, risk groups, and potential risk factors 
                                                          
34 For a thoroughly negative answer, which rejects Hardt and Negri’s notion of Empire tout court, see 
Rabinow and Rose, “Thoughts on the concept of biopower today”. For more sympathetic, but no less 
effective critiques see Alberto Toscano, “Always Already Only Now: Negri and the Biopolitical” in Murphy, 
S. T. and Mustapha, A-K (eds.), The Philosophy of Antonio Negri, vol. 2: Lessons in Constitutive Power (London: 
Pluto Press, 2007); Brynnar Nelson Swenson, The Corporate Form: Capital, Thesis (PhD), ProQuest LLC (2008), 
115: Brynnar also criticises Hardt and Negri’s conceptualisation of real subsumption for contradicting “both 
Marx’s writing and Negri’s [own] earlier works”. See also Jason Read, “Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: 
Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity”, Foucault Studies, no. 6, (2009), 25-36. 
35 Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 95. 
36 For a counter-view see Lee Quinby, “Taking the Millenialist Pulse of Empire’s Multitude: A Genealogical 
Feminist Diagnosis”, in Paul Andrew Passavant and Jody Dean (eds.), The Empire new clothes: Reading of Hardt 
and Negri (Great Britain: Routeldge, 2007), 247. 
37 Alberto Toscano, “Always Already Only Now: Negri and the Biopolitical”. Note, however, that this is a 
claim that can also be made against Agamben’s use of the term. On this see again the aforementioned work 
by Toscano, but also Mathew Coleman and Kevin Grove, “Biopolitics, Biopower and the Return of 
Sovereignty”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, no. 27 (2009), 489-507. 
38 Sergei Prozorov, “The Unrequited Love of Power: Biopolitical Investment and the Refusal of Care”, 
Foucault Studies, no. 4 (2007), 53-77. 
39 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 243, 244, and 245. 
40 Read, “Genealogy of Homo-Economicus, 31, and n4. 
41 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 246. 
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in order to prevent, contain, and manage them.42 Biopower, says Foucault, is “an explosion of 
numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of 
populations.”43 In particular, Foucault discusses the use of statistics and probabilities. 
However, in line with Lemke we can add “indirect techniques for leading and controlling 
individuals without at the same time being responsible for them.”44 Biopower relates to 
governments’ concern with fostering the life of the population by controlling all those factors 
that could put it at risk. It also works by trying to make individuals responsible for their own 
well-being. The aim of biopower increasingly becomes that of administering and mastering 
risk through preventive strategies of intervention, micro-mechanisms and tactics of power, 
which include “modes of subjectification through which individuals are brought to work on 
themselves.”45 Unlike sovereignty’s old right (“to take life or to let live”), biopower’s aim is to 
preserve a healthy society thorough a multiplicity of technologies of power. 
 
State Racism and the Unresolved Question of Sovereign Power 
Nevertheless, despite Foucault wanting to move away from sovereign power, he is forced to 
return to it. He has to return to it in order to address the question – a question that happens to 
be not fully answerable within his own genealogical framework or at least to create problems 
for it – of how killing on a massive scale is still possible in a society dominated by technologies 
of biopower. Foucault is referring to 1930’s Germany specifically but, as we will see later, his 
argument is not simply reducible to it. He specifically asks, 
 
How is it possible for a political power to kill, to call for deaths, to demand deaths, to give 
the order to kill, and to expose not only its enemies but its own citizens to the risk of death? 
Given that this power’s objective is to essentially make live, how can it let die.46 
  
His provocative answer is that racism makes sovereignty’s old right “to take life or let live” 
possible within the field of governmentality in contemporary societies. State racism is what 
makes killing on a massive scale possible today. According to him, racism is what provides the 
modern state, and in particular the Nazi state, with the “right” to kill with impunity by 
creating a caesura between what must live and what must die. 
This is key, not only because racism provides an answer, however partial, to the 
problem of sovereign power, and more specifically to that of its persistence. Far from having 
been replaced, sovereign power persists and takes on new forms. But it is important because it 
alerts us to a fundamental dimension of power – what we could define as “the racial 
dimension” – which is left under-theorised by contemporary theorists, such as Giorgio 
                                                          
42 Nicholas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 235. 
43 Foucault, History of Sexuality, 140; Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 242. 
44 Thomas Lemke, “The birth of bio-politics: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the College de France on neo-liberal 
Governamentality”, Economy and Society, vol. 30, no. 2 (2001), 201. Foucault later adds political economy to 
the list, which, in his words, constitutes a science that analyses “the production of collective interest through 
the play of desire” (Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, 72). 
45 This also relates to Foucault’s notion of “self-care” (Lemke, “The birth of bio-politics”). See Paul Rabinow 
and Nikolas Rose, “Biopower Today”, BioSocieties, vol. 1, no. 2 (2006), 197; 195- 218; and again Read, 
“Genealogy of Homo-Economicus”. 
46 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 254. 
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Agamben, who through their work have produced a renewed interest “in Foucault’s work in 
the English-speaking world” and in the question of sovereignty itself. In particular, Golder 
attributes the renewed interests in Foucault to: 1) the translation into English of Society Must Be 
Defended; 2) “a confluence of certain political and historical events [such as proclamation of the 
war on terror];” 3) “the influence of contemporary philosophers who have continued, 
extended or adapted Foucault’s biopolitical analysis.”47 Golder cites Giorgio Agamben as, 
perhaps, the most important. We will return to Agamben and in particular to his 
conceptualisation of sovereign power later in order to make evident some of the oscillations 
with Foucault’s own formulation. But let’s now briefly see how Agamben does discuss the 
issue of racism in an interesting short paper, titled “Movement,” where he directly tackles this 
question in relation to Schmitt’s articulation of the Nazis Reich as exposed in his 1933 essay 
“State, Movement, People,” albeit in a way that leaves many questions open.48 In what follows, 
Agamben’s understanding of racism as put forward in this paper will be critically presented 
and questions will be raised about his dismissal of race as key concept. Later we will introduce 
Foucault’s more subtle, although again not exhaustive, discussion. 
In brief, Agamben’s argument – an argument that attempts to address the question of 
what the term movement means and how best to define it – is that Schmitt’s understanding of 
movement alerts us to the perils of thinking the movement a-critically; as external or 
autonomous in relation to the people.49 Agamben argues that for Schmitt, the movement is 
paramount. It is the truly autonomous, political element that “finds its specific form in the 
relation with the National Socialist Party and its direction.”50 For Schmitt, the movement acts 
as the linking element between the people (i.e., the German people) and the State. According 
to Agamben, however, although Schmitt has ultimately the merits of bringing attention to the 
process of politicisation of the movement, what he does not say is that the movement is 
originally non-political. To politicize itself the movement needs “a People” with which to 
identify and “a people” from which to separate itself.51 In Agamben’s words, the movement 
“can only find its own being political by assigning to the un-political body of the people an 
internal caesura.”52 It is though this caesura – or by deciding what constitutes the friend and 
thus at the same time the enemy – that the movement can politicize itself or become political. 
In Schmitt, the internal caesura that allowed for the politicization of the movement took an 
obvious racist form. Schmitt’s equation of the sovereign with the Führer, and the friend with 
the race is notorious. Schmitt says that “’friend’ is originally only the person to whom 
genealogical bounds unite,” implying that the enemy is always and necessarily foreign and 
                                                          
47 Ben Golder, “Review of Biopolitics and Racism”, Foucault Studies, no. 3 (2005), 122.  
48 Giorgio Agamben, ”Movement”, Uni.Nomade, Seminar War and Democracy (2005). Available at 
http://www.egs.edu/faculty/giorgio-agamben/articles/movement/; Carl Schmitt, State, Movement, People: the 
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Draghici (US: Plutarch Press, 2001). 
49 In his usual, emphatic style, Agamben argues that despite many before and after him using the term, “the 
only person who tried to define this term was a Nazi jurist: Carl Schmitt” (Agamben, “Movement”). 
50 Ibid. 
51 See also Agamben’s discussion of the term people in Means Without Ends: Notes on Politics, edited and 
translated by Vicenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino (Minneaplois: Unniversity of Minnesota Press, 2000), 32 
and of constituting versus constituted power in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 31. 
52 Agamben, Movement. 
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other, even as its specific identification at any given time depends on an arbitrary sovereign 
decision.53 To this extent, authors like Ojakangas are only partially correct to suggest that 
“there exists no a priori criteria” for deciding who the enemy is.54 As Agamben says, in Schmitt 
it is the “equality of the lineage” that becomes “the [implicit] criterion that, in separating what 
is foreign from what is equal, decides at each turn who is friend and who is enemy.”55 In other 
words, for Schmitt, the line separating friends and enemies is never “colour blind.” Schmitt 
talks about the Identity of the Race.56 
Today, however, Agamben argues, the caesura can be racial as well as “a function of 
the management or government of the un-political element which is the population, the 
biological body of the humankind and the peoples that need governing.”57 But what does it 
mean to argue that today’s caesura can still take a racial form or the form of management or 
government? Is this development a consequence of the different characteristics⁄forms that the 
state takes in contemporary societies? Apart from thinking of it as an increasingly endemic 
principle of social organisation, how does Agamben understand management or government? 
These are questions that Agamben does not address here. It seems that in this article Agamben 
moves to another direction altogether, stressing the centrality and primacy of the movement 
itself. It is the movement in its relation to the sovereign in the figure of the state, where any 
forms of mediation between the two is displaced, that is the decisive element. In this analysis, 
the movement comes to coincide with the sovereign, that is to say, the movement is the one 
that decides.58 This disquisition on the movement is continued in a threshold to his The Reign 
and the Glory where Agamben also explicitly tackles the question of management (oikonomia) 
and, in particular, of its (Christian) prehistory. In the book, Agamben explores how theological 
or trinitarian oikonomia is central to an understanding of both sovereign power and 
government; where however it is on the latter that Agamben focuses his attention this time. As 
we will see in a moment, his previous works instead centred on sovereign power and its 
relation to biopolitics. But in The Reign and the Glory, he says, “the foundation [l’origine] of 
politics is not sovereignty, but government, it is not the king, but the minister, it is not the law, 
but the police while ‘the modern state’ is that which takes upon itself this ‘double structure of 
the governmental machine.”59 In other words, the state remains important but in no longer 
central. However, this does not only seem to conflict with his previous formulation as 
indicating “a much more fundamental theoretical demonstration of the intimacy between each 
                                                          
53 Schmitt, Concept of the Political, 104. 
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Movement, People: The Triadic Structure of the Political Unity, edited and translated by Simona Draghici 
(Plutarch Press, 2001). 
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side of the figure of power.”60 But again, it does not really address the question of the relation 
between governmental practices and racism in contemporary societies and still leaves a 
question open as to why today’s caesura (can) take(s) a managerial form (as opposed to a 
racist one?). As authors such as Traverso and Bahuman have suggested, the Nazi regime was 
also not simply racist but already based on a specific form of governing in which impersonal 
bureaucratisation and managerial polices, as well as racism, played a cardinal role.61 
According to Traverso, “Auschwitz was modelled throughout on the Taylorist principle of 
productive rationality, with death as the end product of a ‘rational’ processing of raw material 
– deported Jews.”62 From this it follows that these two forms – the Nazi’s form and today’s 
managerial form – have much more in common than generally thought and cannot be 
understood as neatly opposable (even though in my view it would be mistaken to simply 
superimpose them). As we will see later, this reading appears to find supporting evidences in 
both Foucault and Agamben. In particular, through his understanding of sovereignty as 
always and already biopolitical, Agamben implies that these two forms are compatible, if not 
exactly the same. However, precisely how today’s managerial caesura relates to racism is left 
unanswered in Agamben. 
Even though Foucault does not answer this question directly, nor, as we shall see in 
more details later, does his account fully resolve the tensions that exist between sovereign 
power and biopower, his conceptualisation does provide a rather original and instructive 
understanding of racism, which can and has been extended to today’s state practices. In 
particular, Foucault starts from an analysis of “race war,” or war between what were regarded 
as irreducible distinct races in the seventeenth-century, as furnishing the model for the notion 
of “class war,” and moves toward an idea of modern racism as that which “makes killing 
acceptable”63He says that racism is “a way of introducing a break into the domain of life that is 
under power’s control: the break within what must live and what must die.”64 By this, Foucault 
means two things. First, that it is through racism that ‘the hierarchy of races, the fact that 
certain races are described as good and that others, in contrast, are described as inferior’ is 
established; that the absolute worth of certain groups within a population and the complete 
insignificance of others is decided. Second, that racism renders killing, which for Foucault is 
sovereign power’s basic function, possible and acceptable because it works in a way that makes 
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and Society, vol. 29, no. 3, (2012), 152. Although extremely interesting in terms of bringing new light into 
Agamben’s project, as Negri says, The Kingdom and the Glory moves away from the analysis of the nature of 
sovereignty (or political theology from which, according to Agamben, sovereignty derives), focusing instead 
on oekonomia or art of government (or economic theology) and on the spectacle of political glory (Antonio 
Negri, “Sovereignty: That Devine Ministry of the Affairs of Early Life”, JCRT, vol. 9.1, no 96 (2008)). In The 
Kingdom and the Glory what we are presented with is a different periodisation of biopolitics; one which is 
perhaps more in line with that of Foucault but seems to conflict with the one offered by Agamben in 
previous books. 
61 The industrialisation and bureaucratisation of mass murder is discussed, for example, by Enzo Traverso in 
his book The Origins of Nazi Violence, edited and translated by Janet Lloyd (New York: New Press, 2003). See 
also Zygmunt Bahuman, Modernity and The Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
62 Enzo Traverso, “Production Line Murder”, Le Monde Diplomatique (Febraury, 2005). Available at: 
http://mondediplo.com/2005/02/15civildiso  
63 Foucault, Society Must be Defended, 254. 
64 Ibid. 254. 
Fiaccadori: The Paradox of Biopower 
162 
 
it compatible with the exercise of biopower or with a governmental way of administering 
things. By declaring “[i]f you want to live, the other must die,” racism transforms the 
relationship of war (i.e., a relationship based on the destruction or annihilation of enemies) into 
a “biological-type relationship,” which renders the death of certain groups acceptable to the 
extent that, in Foucault’s words, it “will make life in general healthier: healthier and purer.”65 
More specifically, for Foucault, what makes racism function in a way that differs from how the 
relationship of war does is its treatment of political adversaries. “In the biopower system” or 
“economy of biopower,” where racism becomes inscribed as one of the basic mechanisms of 
power in the modern state, Foucault argues that enemies are no longer treated as political 
adversaries but as threats (and here Schmitt is clearly a very significant point of reference for 
him).66 This, says Foucault, is what justifies the murderous function of the state in modern 
times. The state is no longer an instrument of one race against another, as it was in the struggle 
of “peoples.” But “a discourse against power is transformed in a discourse of power.”67 He 
adds, racism is, quite literally, revolutionary discourse in an inverted form. 
Now whether “race war” can simply be equated to “class war”, even if only in an 
inverted form, is in my view doubtful for reasons that I cannot explore in great detail, as this 
subject would require a separate paper. 68 However, what I would like to point out is that there 
is an ambiguity in Foucault’s discourse which could lead to what in my view is a problematic 
conceptual equation of totalitarianism with both Nazism and Stalinism – and in fact although 
Foucault never explicitly mentions “totalitarianism” in his discussions, he too ends up 
conflating the two. Foucault is surely correct to advert of the risks of a re-appropriation and 
inversion of a discourse against power by the state – an inversion that certainly did to an extent 
take place even within the context of the Soviet order. It is now acknowledged by most that the 
biologisation and dehumanisation of adversaries were not exclusively part of the Nazis’ 
strategy. Nevertheless, there seems to be a substantial difference between the two regimes that 
is ignored in this discourse. It could be argued that what in reality distinguishes Leninism first 
but also to an extent Stalinism later from Nazism is exactly their different construction of the 
enemy. Whilst the Nazis aspired to create a state freed from unwanted enemies – a racial state 
– Russia, to put it in Arendt’s words, attempted to “organiz[e] different peoples on the basis of 
national equity,” where the adversaries where principally political.69 It is not by chance that the 
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idea of Herrenvolk or “white supremacy” was attacked during the October Revolution by 
calling “the ‘slaves in the colonies’ to break their fetters.”70 This does not deny that “terror, 
deportations and mass executions,” took place during the Soviet regime, but casts doubts on a 
too easy, although not particularly original, equation between Nazism and Stalinism or, 
according to some, fascism and communism, which as Kershaw suggests is surely “legitimate, 
but has limited potential.”71 
Nevertheless, despite the limited usefulness of equating the Soviet and the Nazi 
regimes, Foucault is indeed correct to say that (all) states tend to seek legitimation for their 
murderous practices by using racist discourses. By dehumanising their adversaries, one has 
only to think of how today’s so-called terrorists are described, they create the conditions for 
polices that would otherwise be very difficult to accept. Racism serves the state a twofold 
purpose: affirming its sovereignty, whilst disabling that of those it perceives as threats. By 
acting as the protector of the “integrity, the superiority, and the purity of the race,” the state 
uses racism “to protect its sovereignty via medical normalization” and (in the case of the Nazi 
state) “via eugenics”72 and to extend the security discourse to everything that threatens society. 
To this extent, it is difficult to see how “the destruction of hierarchies and separations,” which 
Ojakangas identifies, in our view, simplistically with the aim of biopower, can be practically 
achieved in the present.73 The construction of security threats, differentiated by their degree of 
dangerousness, is essential to the modern state. It is that which allows the state to present itself 
as capable of protecting populations both within and outside its borders, permitting in a sense 
its survival in an age where processes of globalisation have displaced, although by no means 
exhausted, many of the state’s primary functions. As argued elsewhere,74 accounts that suggest 
that processes of globalisation, including securitisation processes and those related to 
neoliberal governmentality, undermine the capacity of states to decide are not completely 
misguided. But they certainly are deficient. They are unable to appreciate, on the one hand, the 
extremely potent functions of (some) states, which far from being passive have been shown to 
actively participate in these processes by, for instance, supporting financial institutions.75 On 
the other hand, they miss that the state in effect never was all-powerful and all-encompassing. 
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As Thorup says, these claims often rely “on an exaggeration of the power of the modern state 
historically, where the [Weberian] theoretical definition as the legitimate and the effective 
monopoly of violence is taken to be an accurate description of its practices.”76 This appears to 
both challenge Foucault’s idea of the state as losing control and confirm his view of it as one 
among other power relations; as a non-autonomous form of power.77 As Foucault rightly 
suggests, the state is a complex form of power – Foucault refers to it as an effect (more on this 
below). But it is a form of power that nevertheless retains some very important functions. 
Protecting populations from external and internal threats has become one of the main 
functions of states today – or at least one of the main ways in which states try to legitimise 
themselves. As both Foucault and Agamben note, having lost (or delegated to others) many 
but crucially not all of their functions, states more and more make the controlling of 
population, together with the construction of security threats, their (main) paradigm of 
governing. 78 The war on terror, the modality with which it was/is thought and fought is 
testament of this. 
This, that is to say the possibility of extending his discourse to contemporary warfare 
and securitisation of state practices, is in my opinion and as other others have suggested what 
makes Foucault’s understanding of state racism particularly appealing.79 Foucault’s account of 
racism does not offer a clear specification of the meaning of “race.” Foucault suggests that 
“race is not pinned to a stable biological meaning,” implying that even as it is based on 
biologically defined traits or so-called genotypes-phenotypes race is ultimately a socially and 
historically constructed concept, thus, easily exploitable and amendable. His understanding 
can therefore help to elucidate some of the racialised dimensions of today’s warfare practices, 
especially with regard to how the “race” and/or the idea of intrinsic cultural differences might 
be used by powerful states to wage wars – from the war on terror to “humanitarian wars” – 
and “to make killing with impunity a customary practice of control.”80 As authors such as 
Mark Kelly and Achille Mbembe suggest, Foucault’s conceptualization of ”state racism” or 
“bio-racism” provides insights on how to comprehend the way in which states continue to use 
“race” as a technology; as a manner of deciding over the life and death of people. Both Kelly 
and Mbembe use Foucault’s notion of state racism to explain racialised aspects the war on 
terror. But Foucault’s take further helps explain state practices that exclude, criminalize, and 
dehumanize a set of people (e.g. terrorists, immigrants, refugees, Romani people etc.) because 
of their assumed cultural difference, at the same time as they create the myth of a complete 
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securitised or securitisable society.81 It is this same myth that helps the state to re-establish its 
authority and, as Luibhéid has argued in the context of Irish asylum seekers polices, remake 
racial and national boundaries that are no longer so secured and stable in the contemporary 
era.82 Of course, Foucault’s notion of racism can also be extended to interpret and critique 
other (non)state discourses, such as the discourse on biotechnology for example; but it is really 
the question of state sovereignty that interests us here. 
To this extent, it is crucial to note, that although Foucault does an excellent job in 
tracing the interaction between biopower and sovereignty in the twentieth century, as touched 
upon above, and as we will see in more details in a moment, his reflections on state racism 
open themselves up to some very thorny questions. These are questions that, I believe are 
crucial not so much for showing the limits of his theory but because they point to the 
difficulties of moving away from macro questions and in particular from the question of power 
as sovereign power. As Sheth says, no matter the nature of the division between what must be 
excluded and/or killed and what must be included, there must be some element that drives 
and initiates this division83 In other words, according to Sheth, Schmitt’s question of who 
decides remains central and Foucault’s notion of state racism, it is fair to say, cannot be said to 
circumvent this question altogether. In fact, it indirectly answers it; even as the question itself 
is not posed. For Foucault, it appears that it is the state – as we have seen Foucault use the 
expression “state racism” – that decides the lines by which the division is made. Needless to 
say that for Foucault the state is not reducible to the figure of the sovereign. However, for 
Schmitt, “he who decides (on the state of exception)” is sovereign,84 which brings us back 
exactly to where we started: the relation⁄tension between biopolitics and sovereign power on 
the one hand, and racism and biopolitics on the other. What does it mean to say that racism 
works in a way that is totally new and compatible with the exercise of biopower? What are the 
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consequences of this conceptualization of racism for Foucault’s understanding of the (non-) 
relation between biopower and sovereignty? 
 
The Problem of Sovereign Power and of its Persistence 
As previously outlined, the case that Foucault cites as an example of state racism – where we 
use “example” in the Agambenian sense of something that, because of its exemplarity, can 
teach us about the modern state in general is that of the Nazi regime. It was during the Nazi 
regime, Foucault argues, that state racism becomes first and foremost “biological racism,”85 
establishing an exact coincidence between the power to kill or sovereign power and biopower. 
He says: 
 
The Nazi State makes the field of the life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in 
biological terms absolutely coextensive with sovereign right to kill anyone, but also its own 
people.86 
 
During the Nazi regime, race becomes the pivot around which the state came to exert its (bio-) 
power both in a sovereign and biopolitical (administrative, preventive) fashion. The Nazi State 
took up the theme of “State racism” and developed it “in the legend of warring races” for the 
biological protection of the German race87 – what Schmitt calls “the identity of the species.” 
Here Foucault, therefore, acknowledges the persistence of old sovereign power “to take life or 
to let live.” He also provides an answer to the problem of how sovereign power is able to 
persist within contemporary societies. Through racism, Foucault investigates how the exercise 
of killing (“sovereignty’s old right”) is possible within a “normalizing society” whose basic 
biopolitical function is to improve and prolong life.88 
However, is his response to the question of sovereignty entirely convincing? In my 
view, it is not. In particular, what is doubtful is not so much Foucault’s specific interpretation 
of racism, which as I have tried to demonstrate above offers very important points of reflection 
that can and have indeed been used quite effectively by contemporary theorists to analyse the 
workings of power in contemporary societies. What is questionable is how Foucault can 
sustain the coextensivity between biopower and sovereign power within his system of thought 
which aims, as Foucault himself has often claimed, to move away from it. It could be argued 
that, for Foucault, this coextensivity is a historical singularity related to the Nazi regime rather 
than a generalizable position. That it does not create any problems for his assertion about his 
analytics of power as given above. This is the position of, for instance, Rabinow and Rose who 
in their article argue that “‘paroxysmal’ forms of biopower, linked to the formation of 
absolutist dictatorship and mobilization of technical resources,” which “have led to a 
murderous thanatopolitics” are exceptional, not to be linked to how biopower works in 
                                                          
85 Foucault also and again refers to “Soviet State racism” (Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 83). 
86 Ibid., 260. Interesting to note that even though Foucault does not use Schmitt’s terminology here, he recog-
nises the proximity between sovereignty and enmity – something which Schmitt not only recognised but 
tried to establish over a number of works – in the ability of the state to kill “his own people” and “anyone” it 
regards as threat. 
87 Ibid., 82. 
88 Ibid., 254, and 60. 
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contemporary states.89 This is arguably a plausible and a reasonable reading and, to the extent 
that it allows one to look at Nazism as historically specific, something that even the starkest of 
critics of Nazism as unique event would probably not hesitate to embrace; a reading that has 
certain strengths. Nevertheless, if our claim about Foucault employing the Nazi case as an 
example from which to draw lessons about the modern state in general is correct – a claim 
corroborated by Foucault’s suggestion that it is at the time when biopower emerges and 
inscribes racism in the state apparatus that racism becomes “the basic mechanism of power, as 
it is exercised in modern States”90 – then we are forced to recognize that Foucault cannot 
completely circumvent the problem of sovereign power. In order to explain the exercise of 
killing in modern states, he is compelled to return to it. In this respect, is Genel’s assertion that 
there is no tension in Foucault’s idea about biopower and sovereign power being coextensive 
and at the same time heterogeneous satisfying?91 Or should we acknowledge, as Esposito 
suggests, that in reality we do not find in Foucault’s text, an absolute resolution to the problem 
of sovereignty, but a continuous oscillation between an interpretation of biopolitics as 
irreducible to sovereign power, and another for which biopolitics is part of the articulation of 
sovereignty?92 
Indeed, our claim is that in Foucault there does seem to be an unresolved tension 
between, on the one hand, an idea of biopolitics as representing a radical break with old forms 
of sovereign power and, on the other, an idea of it as coextensive to it; as constituting part of 
the articulation of sovereignty. This is clearly made evident by his discussion of Nazism but 
also, as Esposito rightly notes, by the fact that Foucault uses both the term “replace” and 
“complement” to explain the workings of biopower in relation to sovereignty, sometimes in 
the same sentence. Thus, for instance, Foucault says, 
 
[…] one of the greatest transformations political right underwent in the nineteenth century 
was precisely that, I wouldn’t [sic] say exactly that sovereignty’s old right – to take life or let 
live – was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right […]. This is the right, or 
rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die [or biopower].93  
 
What this shows is that Foucault’s analytics maintains a level of ambiguity with respect to the 
question of the relation between biopower and sovereign power. While providing vital 
theoretical tools to analyse contemporary securitisation and racialising practices and creating 
useful lines of enquiry, Foucault’s notion of state racism appears, if not exactly to contradict, to 
at least create problems for his understanding of biopower, while bringing attention to the 
difficulties of moving away from sovereignty’s old right. By bringing the question of 
sovereignty to the forefront, the example of Nazism implicitly challenges one of Foucault’s 
methodological starting points: the idea that there is no sovereign; thus, putting into question 
his (main) understanding of biopolitics as unrelated to sovereign power. 
                                                          
89 Rabinow and  Rose, “Thoughts on the concept of biopower today”.  
90 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 254, emphasis mine.  
91 Katia Genel, “The Question of Biopower: Foucault and Agamben”, Rethinking Marxism, vol. 18, issue 1 
(2006), 43-62. 
92 Roberto Esposito, BIOS, Biopolitica e Filosofia (Torino: Einaudi, 2004), 49. 
93 Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, 241, emphasis mine; Esposito, Biopolitica e Filosofia, 34. 
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This is a point that Agamben makes explicit when he says that even though Foucault’s 
analysis has shown how these two faces of power work, it has failed to elucidate the points at 
which sovereign power (political techniques) and modern techniques of power (technologies 
of self) converge.94 Agamben’s notion of sovereignty as biopolitical, whereby the decision on 
the exception is a decision about life and more precisely about the threshold between life and 
death, can be seen as an attempt to readdress the problem of sovereignty in terms of what is for 
him an implicit thought in Foucault. Through his notion of (bio)sovereignty, Agamben 
attempts to account for mechanisms of state power that, although arguably more prevalent in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, continue, in different forms, to permeate 
contemporary societies.95 According to Agamben, the production of a specifically biopolitical 
body is ultimately dependent on the sovereign’s capacity to exclude through inclusion what 
he calls “bare life” or politically unqualified “life” from the juridico-political order. From this 
perspective, biopolitics is not only absolutely coextensive with sovereign power but biopolitics 
is both historically and conceptually the original activity of sovereignty. In other words, 
according to Agamben, sovereignty is founded on biopolitics. Thus, from his perspective 
Foucault is right in arguing that “when life begins to be included in the mechanisms and 
calculations of State power, politics turns into biopolitics and that this signals the decisive 
event of modernity.”96 However, Agamben expresses puzzlement toward Foucault’s 
suggestion that life only becomes a political object in early modern Europe and, consequently, 
to conceptualize biopolitics as an exclusively modern phenomenon. Instead, what Agamben 
intends to show is that from the earliest treaties of political theory, particularly in Aristotle’s 
notion of man as “a political animal,” a notion of sovereignty as power over life or biopower is 
implicit. To this extent, bare life is the condition of modern politics (i.e., essential to its 
constitution). In Agamben’s words, “bare life is the original activity of sovereign power,”97 
even as it is a condition that is necessarily negative or negated; one that only appears as such 
when the topology (or the hidden logic/location) on which it is based (i.e., the topology of 
exception or “inclusive exclusion”) is fully displaced.98 Consequently, for Agamben, no notion 
of biopolitics or biopower99 can do away with the question of sovereignty. Specifically, it 
cannot ignore what he calls ‘the paradox of sovereignty’, whose topology (or hidden logic), in 
line with Schmitt, he identifies in “the state of exception.”100 By deciding on the exception the 
                                                          
94 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 5; See also and again Esposito, Biopolitica e Filosofia. 
95 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 7. For a differing view see Lazzarato, “From Biopower to Biopolitics”, Pli The War-
wick Journal, vol. 13 (2002), 100-112. 
96 Foucault quoted in Agamben, Homo Sacer, 3. 
97 Ibid., 6. 
98 The word topology derives from the Greek τόπος, topos + λόγος, logos. The Oxford English Dictionary gives 
two definitions: 1) the study of geometrical properties and spatial relations unaffected by continuous change 
of shape or size of the figures involved 2) the branch of mathematics concerned with an abstract theory of 
continuity. In Stanzas: Words and Phantasms in Western Culture, Agamben defines philosophical topology as 
the search for topos or “place” but not as something simply spatial “but as something more original than 
place;” as analogous to “what in mathematics is defined as an analysis situs (analysis of site) as opposed to an 
analysis magnitudinis (analysis of magnitude)” (Agamben, The Coming Community, edited and translated by 
Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), xviii-xix).   
99 In Agamben, there is no clear distinction between biopower and biopolitics. 
100 Agamben, Homo Sacer, 15. 
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State, which is “thus granted autonomous – and hence decisive – status,”101 substantiates 
sovereignty and real as opposed to ideal law. 102  
Agamben’s own conceptualisation has been much discussed103 and is certainly not 
without its own problems and not just in terms of the question of racism, which, as we have 
discussed above, remains unspecified. According to Lazzarato, for example, it is Agamben’s 
notion of biopolitics that oscillates continuously between two alternatives. Lazzarato argues 
that for both Agamben and Foucault, the introduction of zoê into the sphere of the polis is the 
decisive event of modernity; it marks a radical transformation of the political and philosophi-
cal categories of classical thought. Yet, he suggests, Agamben is very ambiguous on whether 
the “impossibility of distinguishing between zoê and bios, between man as a living being and 
man as a political subject” is “the product of the action of sovereign power or the result of the 
action of new forces over which power has ‘no control.’’104 This is interesting. The same charge 
made by Agamben toward Foucault is here repeated by Lazzarato against Agamben. It is as if 
almost, if not all, attempts to find a resolution to the problem of whether to consider biopower 
as substitutive for or a complement to sovereign power tend either to reproduce this same 
ambiguity or to underplay the theoretical difficulties that arise from keeping them separate. 
Lazzarato himself could be seen as underplaying Foucault’s own ambiguities as analysed here 
but there are other such examples. In “Impossible dialogue on bio‐power,“ Ojakangas argues 
against Agamben’s reading and suggests that “neither the modern state nor the Third Reich – 
in which the monstrosity of the modern state is crystallized – are the syntheses of the sovereign 
power and bio‐power, but, rather, the institutional loci of their irreconcilable tension.”105 But 
what does this mean? Does it mean that Foucault was mistaken when he himself referred to 
their absolute coextensivity? In a reply to his critics, Ojakangas acknowledges that they can be 
and have been “historically intermingled in many ways […].”106 However, this insight is 
played down in an attempt to smooth over real points of intersection between biopower and 
sovereign power and in so doing, render Foucault’s analytics of power more coherent. What 
this misses, however, is that the tensions in Foucault’s work are not necessarily ascribable to 
him as a writer. As Negri says, “Foucault’s attention focused are [sic] perfectly continuous and 
coherent – coherent in the sense that they form a unitary and continuous theoretical produc-
tion.”107 The tensions in his work in relation to his notion of biopower are not the result of a 
shift in focus but real – that is to say real in the sense of reflecting real conditions of history. 
Returning to Agamben, moreover, it is fair to say that, in line with Schmitt, his own 
understanding tends to reflect a decisionist or essentialist model of the state that seems 
oblivious to its bureaucratic differentiation, group strategies, class fractions, political parties, 
                                                          
101 Sylvie Delacroix “Schmitt’s Critique of Kelsenian Normativism”, Ratio Juris, vol. 18, no. 1 (2005), 37.  
102 The sovereign operates on behalf of the rule of law and the exception is codified in law. But, as Schmitt 
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etc. and to how these might also rely on disciplinary, bio-political and⁄or securitisation 
mechanisms. Even his analysis of the movement as the truly political element is still within an 
essentialist framework where, as we have seen, in line with Schmitt, the state and the 
movement become one and the same. This is because what interests Agamben is not to 
provide a sociology or theory of the state as “a ‘transactional reality’ [réalité de transaction], 
that is to say a dynamic ensemble of relations and syntheses.”108 His intention is rather to 
expose, and provide a critique of, the hidden logic governing the state (of exception) in its 
production of spaces of exception or camps.109 By camp, Agamben means a space or anti-space 
of modernity – Agamben’s primary examples are yesterday’s Nazi camps and today’s refugee 
camps – in which people can be killed and inhumanely treated. The camp corresponds to the 
suspension of law where a zone of anomie is created, which Agamben claims not to be 
unrelated to the juridical order but where normal laws do not apply. However, in focusing on 
hidden logics, Agamben misses important aspects which from a Foucauldian perspective are 
not immaterial. For example, Foucault alerts us that the population “escapes the sovereign’s 
voluntarist and direct action in the form of the law” and is also “driven by its own specific 
phenomena and processes,” where the movement or movements could come to represent a 
more dynamic and autonomous force here.110 Furthermore, and contrary to both Schmitt and 
Agamben, for Foucault the state is not reducible to state sovereignty. Foucault understands the 
state as “the effect, the profile, the mobile shape of incessant transactions which modify, or 
move, or drastically change, or insidiously shift sources of finance, modes of investment, 
decision-making centres, forms and types of control, relationships between local powers, the 
central authority, and so on.”111 In other words, Foucault sees the state not as an essence but as 
constructed through the interplay of “multiple governmentalities.”112 Thus, a Foucauldian 
analysis must take this into account when exploring the power of the state. It must consider 
that there are different levels of decision making and legitimation and a ”diversity of forces 
and groups,” which in turn have an impact on the specific configuration that a given state 
takes at a specific time. In this reading the state does not monopolize all decisions on the 
exception. As argued by Fleur Johns, proceeding from Schmitt’s open characterisation of the 
exception and in line with Foucault’s emphasis on the diffusion of power, “it is possible to 
conceive as both political and exceptional a much broader range of decisions, approached by 
or among a much broader range of agents, aggregations or arrogations, than those which 
Schmitt entertained as such.”113 
Nevertheless, Agamben’s framing of the problem of sovereignty remains helpful. What 
is interesting is not so much Agamben’s Schmittian view of the state (although his powerful 
critique of it is). But that the question of sovereign power and of the persistence of its 
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decisionist logic through and, in line with Johns, we might even suggest beyond the state, are 
being posed and (re)addressed. In the context of what some see as a partial or limited 
resurgence, but which is in my view best considered as the persistence of sovereign power and 
of its logic, it is even more fundamental to analyse the problem of sovereign power; even as 
the current “sovereign debt” crisis is arguably putting further strain on (certain) states’ 
sovereignty.114 This is not to say that we should reduce the question of biopower to that of 
sovereign power. Nor that we should simply treat the state as equivalent to sovereignty. But, 
however limited, the attempt to explain the articulation between biopower and sovereign 
(state) power at any given time – something which, as I have tried to make evident, Foucault 
himself has tried to elucidate through his notion of “state racism” – is surely worth 
considering. It helps us to understand the dark underside of “a formally legitimate power,” to 
adopt Schmitt’s formulation of the state at one point. What is to be rejected and contested 
instead is the conceptualisation of problems and people as threats and the reduction of life to 
“bare life;” a “racialised” life for which the biopolitical caesura identified by Foucault in the 
separation of a population from a people always runs the risk of becoming “final.” 
 
 
Elisa Fiaccadori  
Independent Researcher 
Contact info (elisa.fiaccadori@gmail.com) 
 
                                                          
114 Often now referred as a “sovereign debt” “crisis”, despite the fact that it clearly began as a banking 
“crisis” and that, as Agamben says following Marx, capitalist crises are “always in process […]”, this crisis 
seems to be less about a reassertion of sovereignty than of capitalist dynamics. The fact that (certain) states 
find themselves unable (or unwilling?) to deal with it proves this. Greece is a fitting example. It is 
nevertheless important to point out that austerity measures are often passed as emergency measures, thus 
could also been seen as resembling a state of emergency, and that racialised and immigrant communities are 
amongst the hardest hit by these measures. Thus, even though perhaps not primarily, the logic of exception 
could still be seen as playing a part in the current state of affairs. This is one (but not the only) reason why I 
think that current problems cannot but be understood by taking into account the exploitative nature of 
capitalism, on the one hand, but also the nature and characteristics of (state) sovereignty as well as their 
complicated and sometimes contradictory relation, on the other.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
